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Abstract 
 
A number of sell-side healthcare analysts gain access to information outside the purview of 
management through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Food and Drug Administration 
for records on factory inspections, complaints, and drug and medical device applications. Using a 
difference-in-differences methodology, we find that buy (sell) recommendations and upgrades 
(downgrades) earn higher (lower) stock returns over the year following the receipt of FDA 
records. We also examine the type of information revealed in FDA factory inspection reports, 
and find that analysts are less likely to downgrade and are less pessimistic in their 
recommendations than the consensus recommendation when the information contained in the 
FDA report is not particularly severe.  Our findings are consistent with a subset of analysts 
utilizing non-public information channels independent of management to gain value-relevant 
information about their covered firms.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Sell-side analysts are important to capital markets.  They produce research reports and 
generate earnings forecasts and stock recommendations on covered firms, which move stock 
prices (Bradshaw 2011) and create liquidity within the U.S. stock market (Kelly and Ljungqvist 
2012).  Bradshaw (2011) and Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp (2015) refer to the process by 
which analysts use both public and private sources of information to generate their outputs as a 
“black box,” and call for more research on understanding how analysts acquire and use various 
sources of information.  Whereas most early studies concentrate on analysts’ use of public, 
quantitative information (e.g., financial statements), a burgeoning area of research has emerged 
examining their acquisition of private and qualitative sources of information.  These sources 
include management conference calls (Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner 1999)1, broker-sponsored 
conferences (Francis, Hanna and Philbrick 1997; Bushee, Jung and Miller 2011; Green, Jame, 
Markov, and Subasi 2014), analyst/investor days (Kirk and Markov 2016), site visits (Cheng, 
Wu, Wang, and Wang 2016) and private meetings with management (Soltes 2014).  
A common thread running through these studies is that the channel of private information 
acquisition goes primarily from firm management to analyst.  However, many sell-side analysts 
profess to engage in the acquisition of information outside the purview of management (Brown 
et al. 2015).  Yet, little has been written on understanding how analysts gather and utilize data 
not generated by the firm, primarily because it is difficult for researchers to identify specific 
outside sources analysts use and the dates in which they receive these data.   
                                                        
1 Beginning on March 28, 2003, Regulation G requires public companies to furnish a Form 8-K to the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission within five business days after issuing an earnings release.  These releases are 
usually part of a conference call, suggesting that after this date, conference calls may be considered public rather 
than private information.  
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In this study, we identify a source of external information used by some healthcare 
analysts:  Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) for FDA-generated records pertaining to healthcare firms. The FDA maintains records on 
its factory inspections, drug and medical device applications, and complaints by consumers and 
healthcare professionals. These records generally are non-public in that firms are not required to 
share them with outsiders. Thus, analysts can access the non-public records only through FOIA 
requests to the FDA. 
 Using our own FOIA requests to the FDA, we received a pdf file delineating all FOIA 
requests and outcomes made to the FDA between 1999 and 2014.  The file contains over 180,000 
requests; we are able to identify 873 of these requests as originating from sell-side analysts, with 
the remaining requests coming from other interested parties including investors, insurance 
companies, hospital, and law firms.2  
We use the full I/B/E/S database to identify all healthcare analysts and classify them as 
FOIA analysts (treatment) and non-FOIA analysts (control) based on whether they made a FOIA 
request to the FDA. Consistent with Brown et al. (2015) that only a subset of analysts engage in 
the acquisition of outside private information, and with Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) 
contention that the acquisition of private information is inversely related to the costs associated 
with acquisition (e.g., processing costs), we find only 21% of our sample of healthcare analysts 
made at least one FOIA request for FDA records. A probit model explores cross-sectional 
differences in analyst traits associated with the likelihood to make these requests. 
                                                        
2 To understand the extent healthcare analysts use FOIA, we sent out similar FOIA requests to the Federal Aviation 
Administration (airlines) and the Department of Energy (utilities and oil).  From the pdf files they sent us, we found 
no analyst request to the FAA and only 13 analyst requests to the DOE.  We interpret this finding as indicative of 
analysts using different sources of information for different industries (see, for example Cheng et al. 2016). 
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Our first analysis examines the association between the receipt of FDA records and the 
propensity of the analyst to provide a subsequent recommendation on the requested firm. We 
find the receipt of FDA records to be related to a subsequent recommendation change 46.3% of 
the time. Although this finding suggests that the receipt of FDA records may include useful 
information to the FOIA analyst less than one half of the time, we find that this percentage is 
significantly greater than subsequent recommendation changes by analysts without access to 
these records. This latter group includes FOIA analysts who were denied the records by the FDA 
and non-FOIA analysts covering the same stocks.  
 Next we examine stock returns following the subsequent recommendations. Groysberg, 
Healy, and Maber (2011) show that analyst compensation is influenced heavily by whether an 
analyst is a “top stock picker” in his or her industry, and Brown et al.’s (2015) survey of what 
factors are important to analysts’ compensation ranks the profitability of stock recommendations 
above accuracy and timeliness of earnings forecasts.  Thus, stock returns align analysts’ benefits 
with their incentives to acquire non-public information. 
We estimate difference-in-differences (DiD) regressions of long-term stock returns for 
portfolios of buy (sell) recommendations for all analysts on I/B/E/S covering the same company. 
In these regressions, the FOIA analyst and all non-FOIA analysts must have a buy (sell) 
recommendation both in the year before and after the FDA record receipt date.  Thus, we keep 
analyst ability constant in both time periods, only varying the model by whether the treatment 
analyst has or does not have his/her requested FDA records.  We control for analyst ability and 
effort, the information environment surrounding the firm, public information about the firm or 
the FDA record itself, and stock risk factors.  Our regression findings are consistent with buy 
portfolios following the receipt of FDA records outperforming buy portfolios of analysts without 
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these records. We find similar results for sell portfolios – sell/hold recommendations perform 
worse after receipt of FDA records when compared to sell/hold recommendations without these 
records.  In economic terms, the extra monthly return on the buy portfolio is 1.69% per month, 
and the extra return on the sell/hold portfolio is -1.38% per month. In annualized terms, these 
amount to 20.3% and -16.6%.  
One of the central tenets of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is that investors search for non-
public information only if the benefits exceed the costs of finding the information. Our findings 
are consistent with their theory. Specifically, despite the fact that any analyst can make a FOIA 
request, only a minority of healthcare analysts avail themselves of this information channel, 
suggesting a cost to processing the information.3 On the other hand, when the information is 
associated with a subsequent recommendation, the benefits, i.e., the stock returns, are 
economically significant. 
Although our results are consistent with analysts using FDA records when issuing new 
recommendations, the evidence can be considered circumstantial.  To somewhat remedy this 
criticism, we examine some FDA records themselves to try to determine what information in 
these records is related to the likelihood that an analyst would downgrade the covered stock.  We 
choose two types of ex ante “bad news” records to examine – Warning Letters and Forms 483 – 
both containing violations resulting from an FDA inspection of a firm’s factory.  Using two 
FOIA requests, we obtain copies of 39 usable FDA records that also were requested and received 
by our sample of analysts.  We manually read each record and determine that the violations in 
these records can be classified into four general categories – product, manufacturing, testing, and 
                                                        
3 The direct dollar costs of filing a FOIA request to the FDA are trivial. According to the FDA website, the current 
charges for filing a FOIA request are: search and review charges: $23.00, $46.00 and $83.00 depending on the grade 
level of the FDA employee filling the request; duplication: $0.10 per page for standard-size paper or actual cost per 
page for odd-size paper, with no charge for the first 100 pages of duplication; certification: $10 each; computer 
charges: actual cost for time involved; electronic forms/formats: actual cost for form/format requested. 
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documentation.  Consistent with expectations that the first two categories might be more 
damaging to the firm than the latter two categories, we find evidence that downgrades are less 
likely following the receipt of information about a documentation violation.   
 Our study extends the current literature on analysts’ acquisition of private information along 
several new dimensions. First, our setting differs from most previous studies in that FDA records 
are a source of information independent of management.  Thus, this is the first study to do an 
extensive examination into a process by which analysts gather private information from a source 
not emanating from the firm itself.  In fact, a discussion with a FOIA analyst reveals that her 
main purpose for asking for FDA records is to evaluate the veracity of management’s claims 
during conference calls and other face-to-face meetings. 
 To illustrate, on January 10, 2012, Hospira participated in a brokerage conference sponsored 
by J.P. Morgan by giving a corporate presentation (see Bushee et al. 2011; and Green et al. 
2014). The presentation was upbeat, but it also included a slide on a Form 483 issued by the 
FDA on January 4, 2012 on a factory located in Kansas.4   Notably, the slide stated that the 
Kansas factory accounted for approximately 12% of net sales, that the FDA raised six 
“observations”, but that these observations “can be addressed with minimal or no disruption.” 
One week after the conference, a Citigroup analyst filed a FOIA request to the FDA asking for 
that particular Form 483.  Our reading of the Form 483 revealed 3 manufacturing violations, 
including the “propagation of microbial contamination” within the factory’s drug products.  Prior 
to the request, the analyst’s recommendation was a hold (IBES = 3).  On February 16, 2012, 
shortly after receiving the Form 483, the analyst lowered his recommendation to a strong sell 
(IBES = 5). 
                                                        
4 Hospira placed the 34 slides of its presentation on an 8-K filing prior to the presentation.  This discussion is based 
on those slides as well as the records sent to us by the FDA in a FOIA request. 
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 Second, our setting is novel in that FOIA requests are private to the extent that each request 
is made by one analyst only, and unless another analyst sends in a FOIA request for the identities 
of previous requesters (we found none in the FDA pdf file), other analysts are not aware the 
FOIA request was made. These joint properties of privacy and being the sole recipient of the 
private information are similar to Soltes (2014), who examines private meetings between 
analysts, but differ from studies with settings involving groups of analysts or pre-announced 
meeting dates (Bushee et al. 2011; Green et al. 2014; Kirk and Markov 2016; Cheng et al. 2016).  
 Third, our study extends the literature that uses content analysis to discern the types of 
private information analysts use in their outputs.  Huang, Lehavy, Zang and Zheng (2018) 
analyze analyst reports using this approach.  We use a subset of actual FDA records received by 
analysts to examine the types of information they use when making their first post-receipt stock 
recommendations. 
Fourth, our study generally speaks to the costs and benefits of acquiring non-public 
information. Therefore, even though our setting is analysts covering healthcare firms only, it is 
applicable to other industries or settings. For example, analysts can make FOIA requests to other 
public agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or state-level 
agencies (Bolton, Li, Ravina, and Rosenthal 2019). 
 Like all research studies, this study has its limitations. Its main limitation is that, although 
we can observe the timing and the source of non-public information, we cannot unambiguously 
map the direct link from FDA records to the analysts’ stock recommendations. Unlike financial 
data or management forecasts, FDA records contain qualitative information about the firm and 
give no indication of the future economic effects that the FDA’s decision or regulatory action 
will have on the firm. Further, we do not know the full extent of each analyst’s information set 
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about his/her covered firm prior to the receipt of the requested records. Thus, we are unable to 
place the contents of the FDA record(s) within the mosaic of the analyst’s information. Despite 
these caveats, our study opens a new window into the realm of non-public information that 
analysts access to better value their covered firms. 
 
II. FDA and FOIA REQUESTS 
 The FDA is an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Since its 
creation in 1906, the U.S. Courts and Congress have expanded and contracted the scope of its 
oversight.  Today, the FDA has three main roles: (1) oversight of the process leading up to the 
marketing of new products, particularly drugs and medical devices, (2) post-marketing 
monitoring of products, and (3) factory inspections.  
Under the FOIA, analysts may ask the FDA for a copy of any record(s) the agency holds 
pertaining to the requested firm. These reports are non-public in that firms are not required to 
share them with investors, analysts, or other individuals. The FDA, with discretion, places some 
of these records on its website. However, the timing and choice of which records to post are 
completely within the FDA’s discretion, and are sporadic at best (Mullins and Weaver 2013; 
Bruser and McLean 2014). 
 Figure 1 describes the FDA drug approval process.  The process begins with preclinical 
animal testing and winds it way through three separate human testing phases.  If Phases I though 
III are each successful, the firm most likely will file an application with the FDA seeking 
approval to begin marketing the new drug.  On average, the FDA takes approximately six 
months to a year to make its decision on the application. 5  The FDA decision issued to the 
                                                        
5 The FDA’s vetting process is threefold.  It first evaluates the results of the Phase I-III trials.  Next, it examines 
drug labeling on dosage, usage, and side effects.  Lastly, it inspects the facilities where the drug will be produced. 
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company is called an “approval recommendation” (REC); it can be either (i) a rejection, (ii) a 
conditional approval or a non-approval (subject to further modifications, sometimes referred to 
as a Phase IV), or (iii) an approval for the firm to begin marketing its new drug.  Only the REC is 
subject to a FOIA request; that is all documentation and records between a firm and the FDA up 
to and including the application are deemed by the FDA to be proprietary and, therefore, are 
exempt from all FOIA requests.6 7  
As Figure 1 shows, the FDA has an elaborate post-marketing surveillance system.  It 
maintains four databases of “adverse events,” based on either mandatory or voluntary reports by 
the firm, consumers, doctors, hospitals, or other individuals.  These databases include records on 
drugs (FAERS), medical devices (MDR), food, dietary supplements, and cosmetics (CAERS), 
and vaccines (VAERS).  Each record-type is subject to FOIA requests.  
 In 1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act of 1938 gave the FDA the 
authority to conduct factory inspections on food and drug companies. The 1953 Factory 
Inspection Amendment required the FDA to give manufacturers written reports of conditions 
observed during inspections and analyses of factory samples.  
Figure 2 describes the factory inspection process (McDuffee 2011).  Under the FD&C Act, 
registered domestic drug factories are to be inspected by the FDA at least once every two years.  
Notice is not required.  Instead, an FDA inspector arrives at the factory with his/her credentials 
                                                        
6 In the FOIA, there are nine stated exemptions to the presumption of mandatory disclosure. These exemptions 
include breaches of national security, individual privacy, trade secrets, financial confidentiality, internal memoranda 
or letters that are privileged in civil litigation, confidential sources to law enforcement agencies, documents that are 
related to financial institution regulation, and, geological information. These exemptions with respect to FDA 
requests have been upheld by various court decisions (Lurie and Zieve 2006). 
7  Companies are not precluded from voluntarily providing information to the public. Examination of select 
pharmaceutical and biotech companies’ Form 8-Ks reveals that some companies include selective information on 
the three clinical phases and/or their FDA applications in their earnings releases, or more rarely, in a stand-alone 8-
K filing. We also find some but many fewer cases, in which the Form 8-K includes selective information about 
factory inspections and post-market surveillance records. Further, the FDA maintains a website, clinicaltrials.gov, in 
which pharmaceutical companies sometimes place their trial results (Capkun, Lou, and Wang 2017). 
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and a Form 482, the latter being a general form of what the inspector can and cannot examine.  
After the inspection, which can take several days or weeks, the FDA issues an Establishment 
Inspection Report (EIR) if the inspection produces no violations, or a Form 483, which is a list of 
violations.  The firm has a right to remediate the violations or appeal to the FDA; often there will 
be correspondences between the firm and the FDA about either process.  After the FDA 
determines all violations are corrected, it issues an EIR. Tangentially, the FDA issues Warning 
Letters (WL) to manufacturers about “significant” violations of FDA regulations, for example, a 
mislabeling of an ingredient in a drug or food supplement, or its inability to correct factory 
inspection violations.  EIRs, Form 483s, warning letters and related correspondences between the 
company and the FDA are subject to FOIA requests. 
 
 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Analysts’ Identities and FOIA Requests 
 On January 29, 2014, February 11, 2014, March 21, 2014, and June 10, 2015, respectively, 
we filed FOIA requests to the FDA. The information we requested was a list of all FOIA 
requests by outsiders to the FDA between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2014.  The FDA 
responded to our inquiries by giving us pdf files containing 182,149 individual requests.  The 
information provided to us are (i) requester’s identity [both person (“Signature”) and company 
(“Requester”), if applicable]; (ii) date of request; (iii) outcome date; (iv) target firm or 
individual; (v) outcome of the request (e.g., sent, withdrawn, denied); (vi) a short description of 
which agency records were requested.8 
                                                        
8 We submitted the second and third requests to the FDA to better understand the dates provided by the FDA. What 
we call the request date, the FDA calls the “record date;” what we call the outcome date, the FDA calls the “close 
date.”  In both requests, the FDA’s record and close dates align with our request and outcome dates, which was 
included in the FDA’s file to us.  We use our terminology for the sake of clarity. 
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We identify FOIA analysts through the following process: First, we manually examine all 
“Requesters” to identify which ones are brokerage firms. Next, we manually use several Internet 
sites to determine if the “Signature’s” position at the time of the request was an analyst. Most 
“Signatures” have both first and last names, although we have a few cases with last name but 
only an initial for the first name.  Our first search engine is LinkedIn.  If LinkedIn does not have 
the needed information, we turn to BrokerCheck, a website maintained by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) containing background information on current and former 
FINRA-registered security industry professionals.  If BrokerCheck does not have the needed 
information, we search Bloomberg, company websites and Zoominfo.com, the latter being a 
search engine that collects biographical data using publicly available information. These steps 
result in a file of 76 brokerage firms and 221 equity analysts.9 
Table 1, Panel A shows the 182,149 FOIA requests from 1999 through 2014 by year 
(column 4). We have 873 individual requests from the 221 sell-side analysts we identify from the 
FDA pfd file (column 2), with the 181,276 remaining requests coming from non-analysts, 
including hedge funds, insurance companies, public and private companies, hospitals, doctors, 
law firms, consulting firms, and individuals (column 1).  
To derive our final sample, we manually match the 221 equity analysts from the pdf file to 
the I/B/E/S translation file.10  If the requesting person (“Signature”) is on I/B/E/S, we keep that 
analyst.  However, sometimes the “Signature” is not an analyst, but instead is an equity analyst 
                                                        
9 Sometimes, an analyst makes a request in his or her own name. In this case, the “Requester” would be the name of 
the analyst, not the name of the brokerage house. To obtain a complete set of analysts’ requests, we search again 
using analyst names as “Requesters;” we include these requests in our sample. Despite these efforts, we 
acknowledge that our sample may not contain the full set of analyst requests from the FDA file.  
10 The I/B/E/S translation file is for the year 2008. Thus, our matching criteria will not capture sell-side analysts 
working in the years 2009 through 2014 who are not already working as an analyst in 2008. Nor will it capture 
analysts working in earlier years who have left the field by 2008.  On average, the I/B/E/S match retains 60% of the 
FDA pdf file sell-side analysts.  Interestingly, we do not see patterns of attrition from 2008 outwards – instead we 
see random deviations from the mean over time.  However, one should not draw conclusions from these patterns 
since our sample selection does not allow us to examine the counterfactual. 
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associate, assistant or administrative assistant.  In this case, we assume the “Signature” works for 
the chief analyst from the brokerage firm who covers the stock at the time of the FOIA request, 
and we include that chief analyst in our sample.  Our final sample contains 62 brokerage houses, 
comprising 199 equity analysts making 528 individual requests (column 3).  Table 1, Panel B 
presents the identity and frequency of requests for all brokerage firms with 20 or more requests 
over our time period.  As the panel shows, Favus Institutional Research (a private firm providing 
healthcare consulting services to institutional investors), Cowen and Company, and Collins, 
Stewart LLC (a mid-cap stockbroker before being acquired by Canaccord in 2012; Mundy 2011), 
are not in the I/B/E/S database.  These three firms account for a reduction of 144 requests from 
the original FDA pdf file. Despite these three companies not being on I/B/E/S, they illustrate the 
use of FOIA requests to the FDA as a source of information to individuals providing information 
to investors. 
 
Analysts’ Characteristics: FOIA Requesters and Non-FOIA Requesters 
Using the I/B/E/S database, we identify 924 unique healthcare analysts covering each FOIA 
requested stock in our sample over 1999-2014.  Of these analysts, 199 are FOIA requesters and 
725 never used FOIA to request an FDA record.  Thus, FOIA requesters represent 21.5% of our 
full sample of I/B/E/S analysts covering these specific healthcare stocks.   
Table 2, Panel A contains descriptive statistics for FOIA and non-FOIA (control) analysts. 
All variable definitions are in Appendix A.  FOIA analysts, on average, have 5.8 years of direct 
analyst experience, cover 8.6 stocks, work in brokerage firms with 82.7 analysts, and are 
designated Star Analysts 15.3% of the time.  Table 2, Panel B reports summary statistics for a 
probit model on whether the analyst is a FOIA requester (FOIA Requester = 1) or a non-FOIA 
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requester (FOIA Requester = 0) for any individual FOIA-requested stock in the year of the FOIA 
request.   
Our probit findings are similar to previous studies in that an analyst’s propensity to seek 
FDA records is positively related to analyst effort (#Forecasts; Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols 
2001; Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Tucker 2014), to the resources available to the analyst (#Analysts 
at Brokerage Firm; Clement 1999), and to previous forecasts errors (Past Forecast Error).  It is 
also negatively related to Analyst Experience, suggesting that newer analysts are more likely to 
request FDA records.  New to this study, we consider both advanced degrees in business (MBA) 
and advanced degrees in biology, chemistry, other sciences, and medicine (PhD/MD) as being 
useful to healthcare analysts. We find no difference between groups. Finally, based on a private 
conversation with a biotech sell-side analyst, we predict and find that analysts are more likely to 
use FOIA requests to monitor firms after the issuance of more negative stock recommendations 
(Past Recommendation).11 
 
FDA Records Requested under FOIA 
Table 3 contains summary statistics on FOIA analysts’ FDA requests. Panel A presents a 
breakdown of record requests by type. (See Appendix B for definitions).  Since many analysts 
request more than one FDA record-type, for example, an analyst may request an EIR and a Form 
483 on the same date, the number of records exceeds the number of requests from Table 1. For 
our final sample of analysts, 226 out of 655 total requests are for a Form 483, a list of factory 
inspection violations.  Other possibly adverse information documents requested are post market 
                                                        
11  Stock recommendations are taken from the I/B/E/S numeric recommendation code, which assigns 
recommendations on a scale of 1 through 5, representing strong buy, buy, hold, underperform, and sell.   
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surveillance complaints (127), EIRs (54), and warning letters (57).  As for potentially positive 
news, there are 65 requests for approval recommendation documents (RECs).  
Panel B has the outcomes of these requests.  The FDA can send all or some of the requested 
documents (“Sent” or “Partial Sent”) or can deny the release of the document(s) to the requester 
(“Denial” or “Other Reason”).  As the panel shows, 393 requests (385+8) were either fully or 
partially granted, which accounts for 74.4% of the total individual requests.  The other 25.6% 
consists of requests in which the analyst received no information.  To compare this with the full 
FDA population, we gather the percentage of requests granted (partial or full) from the FDA 
website for all processed requests over our time period.  Full or partial grants, as a percentage of 
all processed requests are 74%, a number highly consistent with our sample. 
Panels C and D present some cross-sectional data on how healthcare analysts use FOIA to 
obtain information.  As Panel C shows, FOIA analysts, on average, made at least one request for 
31.7% of their covered companies, which translates to approximately three out of 8.7 covered 
companies.  However, there is variation in the percentage of requested firms across analysts, 
with the bottom quartile requesting FDA records on less than 9.1% of their covered firms and the 
top quartile making FOIA requests on 41.7% of their covered firm portfolio. 
 As Panel D illustrates, analysts use FOIA requests in different ways. Some analysts target 
multiple stocks with simultaneous FOIA requests – 65 of the 199 FOIA analysts (32.7%) sent out 
multiple FOIA requests in any one month at least once. For example, in March 2002, a Goldman 
Sachs analyst sent out FOIA requests for AERs for Amgen and Johnson & Johnson, respectively.   
Some analysts are frequent FOIA users – 63 FOIA analysts (31.7%) made at least three FOIA 
requests to the FDA over our sample period.  Some analysts use FOIA to make requests on 
healthcare stocks not covered by the analyst – 46 FOIA analysts (23.1%) made requests on non-
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2714551 
 14 
covered stocks in the same industry.  Of these 46 analysts, 17 requested FDA records on a 
company in which the analyst covered at a later time.  Thus, even among our FOIA analysts, we 
observe variability in how and when analysts request FDA records.  
 
IV. SUBSEQUENT RECOMMENDATION CHANGES 
Table 4, Panel A presents a breakdown of new stock recommendations by FOIA analysts 
occurring within one year after receipt of the requested record(s).  The receipt of FDA records is 
associated with a subsequent upgrade, downgrade, or a new affirmation 46.3% of the time, with 
the percentages being 11.0% for upgrades, 15.3% for downgrades, and 20.0% for affirmations. 
This finding suggests that the receipt of FDA records may include useful information less than 
one half of the time.  
Looking across record-types, most new recommendations fall within a 50% range, with the 
exception of REC, which elicits new recommendations only 33% of the time.  RECs are the 
FDA’s final decision as to whether the new drug or medical device has been approved for 
subsequent sale and marketing.  Since 2007, the FDA requires pharmaceutical firms to register 
their clinical trials and to publish the results of these trials on the clinicaltrials.gov website within 
12 months of completion.12  Thus, for many trials, analysts have access to prior information 
leading up to FDA approval, which may explain the relatively small number of recommendation 
changes following the receipt of these RECs. 
 To better understand the frequencies in which FDA records are followed by new stock 
recommendations, in Table 4, Panel B, we compare recommendation changes by whether the 
FOIA analyst has or does not have the requested FDA record. Column (1) shows the same 
                                                        
12 Enforcement of these rules, however, is weak with only 41% of trial results actually appearing on the website 
(Zarin, Tse and Sheehan 2015; Capkun, Lou and Wang, 2017) and an even smaller percentage appearing within the 
12 month window.   
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percentages as the last column of Panel A – this is the treatment group where the analyst receives 
at least one FOIA-requested record from the FDA.   
As shown in Table 3, FOIA analysts do not always receive the requested FDA records. In 
column (2), we present the percentage of new recommendations for these stocks. As the column 
illustrates, the overall percent of new recommendations made when the analyst is denied the 
records is 33.0%, compared to 46.3% when he or she receives the records; testing for differences 
in percentages yields a z-statistic of 4.09, significant at the 0.01 level. When examining 
upgrades/downgrades/affirmations, we see evidence that the percentage differences are 
significantly lower for upgrades and affirmations only. 
As Table 3 also shows, analysts do not make FOIA requests on all of their covered stocks. In 
column (4), we present recommendation changes for covered stocks without FOIA requests. For 
these stocks, the analyst issued new recommendations 29.3% over the same year, a percentage 
significantly lower than the 46.3% for the FOIA stocks. When comparing the breakdown of 
upgrades/downgrades/affirmations, we see that this difference hails from downgrades and 
affirmations, but not from upgrades. 
In column (6), we keep the analyst and the stock the same, but we examine changes in 
recommendations made two years prior to the receipt of the FOIA records.13  The overall percent 
of new recommendations made in year -2 is 31.9%, compared to 46.3% in the year when the 
analyst receives the records; testing for differences in percentages yields a z-statistic of 4.44, 
significant at the 0.01 level. When examining upgrades/downgrades/affirmations, we see 
evidence that all three types of recommendation changes are significantly lower in the year in 
which the FOIA analyst did not have FDA records.  
                                                        
13 Using a two-year look-back period instead of the year immediately prior to the request year allows us to better 
isolate the recommendation period from containing information that may have led the analyst to issue the FOIA 
request. 
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 In Table 4, Panel C, we compare percent changes in recommendations in the same covered 
stocks between FOIA and non-FOIA analysts. We see a markedly lower percentage of new 
recommendations by non-FOIA analysts – 11.8% compared to the 46.3% for the FOIA-
requesting analysts.  The differences in new recommendations are significantly different for all 
three classifications of upgrades/downgrades/affirmations. 
The findings in Panels B and C are consistent with an association between the receipt of 
FDA records and the frequency in which the analyst provides a new stock recommendation. 
However, as Panel A shows, the receipt of FDA records is associated with a subsequent 
recommendation change only 46.3% of the time. In total, Table 4 supports the view that some 
requested FDA records contain new information to the FOIA requester.  
 
V. STOCK RETURNS FROM SELL-SIDE ANALYST STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS 
Methodology and Descriptive Statistics 
Calendar time portfolio approach 
In this section, we test whether healthcare analysts’ stock recommendations are more 
profitable after receiving requested FDA records. Brown et al. (2015) find that analysts consider 
the profitability of stock recommendations to be more important than the accuracy and timeliness 
of earnings forecasts, a finding consistent with Groysberg et al. (2011). 
We employ a standard calendar time portfolio approach to measure stock returns (Fama 
1998; Lyon, Barber, and Tsai 1999; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy 2010).  We construct two 
treatment portfolios: (1) a BUY portfolio of stocks consisting of FOIA analyst upgrades to buy 
or strong buy from the previous recommendation, or initial coverage with a buy or strong buy 
rating, or reiterations of buy or strong buy recommendations, and (2) a SELL portfolio of stocks 
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consisting of FOIA analyst downgrades to hold, underperform, or sell from the prior 
recommendation, or initial coverage with a hold, underperform, or sell recommendation, or 
reiterations of hold, underperform or sell recommendations. A stock is included in each portfolio 
only if a new recommendation appears within 12 months after receipt of FDA records. We also 
create two BUY and SELL control sample portfolios for healthcare analysts covering the same 
stocks as the FOIA analysts, but who do not request FOIA FDA records.  
We next accrue daily stock returns on each of the four portfolios. Figure 3 demonstrates the 
time line following the FOIA analyst’s receipt of FDA records on day t0.  As an example, we 
designate day t1 as the day in which a FOIA analyst upgrades, initiates or reiterates a buy or 
strong buy recommendation after receiving FDA records.  Consistent with Cohen et al. (2010), 
we skip day t1 and begin accruing returns on day t1 +1.  We accrue stock returns until the analyst 
downgrades the stock (day t2) or until the end of one year after the receipt of FDA records (day t0 
+ 1 year), whichever is shorter. If no new recommendation is issued over the year following day 
t0, we do not include that stock in the portfolio. If more than one FOIA analyst covers the stock, 
we keep the duplicate stock in the portfolio and treat them as distinct stocks (Cohen, et al. 2010).  
Raw returns are calculated on a daily basis and averaged across all FOIA analysts and calendar 
days. 
We adopt the same procedure for non-FOIA (control) analysts, except that we begin 
accruing stock returns on the day in which the control analyst issues his or her upgrade/buy 
recommendation.  Because the stock recommendation date (t1) and the end date (t2) differ 
between FOIA and non-FOIA analysts, our approach assesses the stock-picking ability of the 
FOIA analyst vis-à-vis the non-FOIA analyst covering the same stock after the FOIA analyst’s 
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receipt of FDA records. We repeat the same procedure for sell recommendations, accruing stock 
returns for treatment and control analysts. 
 For a stock to be included in a specific portfolio, for example, the FOIA BUY portfolio, the 
same FOIA analyst must give a buy or strong buy recommendation on the same stock within one 
year prior to day t0. As shown in Figure 3, we designate this pre-period recommendation as day t-
2. We accrue stock returns for this pre-period FOIA BUY portfolio from day t-2 until the FOIA 
analyst either issues an opposite recommendation on day t-1, or until day t0.  Our approach 
creates a balanced sample in terms of having the same analyst and similar recommendation in 
both the pre- and post-receipt return portfolios.  
 
Timing Differences 
 We calculate the average timing difference in days between FOIA and control analysts’ first 
post-receipt date recommendations.  For the BUY portfolio, the mean (median) difference is 104 
(92) days, consistent with FOIA analysts providing more timely recommendations than non-
FOIA analysts following the receipt of an FDA record.  For the SELL portfolio, the mean 
(median) is 95 (69) days, a finding also consistent with FOIA analysts issuing more timely 
recommendations following the receipt of an FDA record. 
 
Univariate Comparisons of Stock Returns 
 Table 5, Panel A presents monthly calendar time portfolio stock returns and their differences 
across analyst-type or time period. These statistics are descriptive because we do not control for 
differences in risk, analyst characteristics, firm characteristics, or other available information. 
For the BUY portfolios, post-receipt date returns across analysts with and without FOIA records 
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produces an average difference in monthly returns of 1.21% (t-statistic = 2.22), which translates 
into a yearly return of 14.52%. Since each portfolio is predicated on the analyst providing a 
buy/strong buy recommendation and/or an upgrade, the primary difference between the two 
portfolios is the receipt of information.  In contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no 
difference in post-receipt date returns for SELL portfolios between requesting FOIA Analysts 
and our sample of control analysts. The difference in post-receipt date returns between FOIA and 
non-FOIA analysts is -0.45% (t-statistic = -0.96).  
 
Multivariate Analyses 
To examine whether our univariate results are driven or affected by other factors, we employ 
a difference-in-differences regression methodology. The regressions are run on daily stock 
returns (Return), but consistent with Cohen et al. (2010), the coefficients on all independent 
variables are adjusted to represent monthly returns. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. For 
the portfolio of BUYS or SELLS, respectively, we estimate the following regression: 
 
Return = α + β1 FOIA Analyst + β2 Post + β3(FOIA Analyst × Post) + β4 Firm Size + β5 B/M  
+ β6 Momentum + β7 Analyst Experience + β8 Ln(# Stocks Covered)  
+ β9 Ln(#Analysts at Brokerage Firm) +  β10 PhD/MD + β11 MBA + β12 Star Analyst  
+ β13 Frequent FOIA Requester  + β14 FOIA Industry Expertise + β15 Forecast Dispersion  
+ β16 Institutional Ownership + β17 Ln(1+# News Articles) + β18 Previous 8K Filing  
+ β19  Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock + FE + ε.                                                                       (1) 
  
FOIA Analyst is one if the analyst receives FDA records, and zero otherwise.  Post is one if 
the stock recommendation is made after the FDA receipt date, and zero otherwise. The 
interaction between FOIA Analyst and Post tests whether stock returns after the receipt of the 
FDA records are different for analysts with and without these records.  
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We create two new analyst ability measures based on how FOIA analysts use FOIA to 
request FDA records. Presumably, frequent FOIA requesters find FDA records to be useful.  
Frequent FOIA Requester is an indicator if the analyst filed at least three FOIA requests over our 
time period.14 According to Brown et al. (2015), 83.42% of surveyed sell-side analysts consider 
“industry knowledge” to be an important input when making stock recommendations; FOIA 
Industry Expertise is an indicator if the analyst made at least one FOIA request to the FDA for an 
uncovered healthcare stock.  We interpret this practice as the FOIA analyst seeking out 
information on competing firms, or more broadly, on his/her covered industry.   
PhD/MD and MBA measure whether an analyst has these post-graduate degrees, 
respectively.   To control for the timeliness of the information contained in the FDA record, we 
include Previous 8K Filing as an independent variable.   For our sample of FOIA requests, 208 
(39%) Form 8-Ks were filed with the SEC prior to the request with some information about the 
requested FDA record. On average, these Form 8-Ks preceded the formal FOIA request by 10.3 
days, with a median lead-time of 7.0 days.  To understand the contents of these filings, we 
manually downloaded and read through each 8-K filing. Notably, the filings do not contain the 
FDA record itself, but only reveal the existence of the record.  Thus, the FDA record itself 
contains more information than what is on the 8-K filing.  Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock is an 
indicator if at least two separate analysts placed FOIA requests with the FDA on the same stock 
within a month of each other. 
Our multivariate regression includes many controls based on the prior literature on stock 
returns (Firm Size, B/M, Momentum) and analysts’ recommendations or forecast errors. We 
                                                        
14 Conversely, we create an indicator if the FOIA analyst request is the first FOIA request to the FDA.  Because this 
indicator and Frequent FOIA Requester are highly negatively correlated, we re-do our analyses with this indicator 
instead of Frequent FOIA Requester.  The empirical results are qualitatively the same with either variable and 
therefore, we only show the empirical results with Frequent FOIA Requester. 
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control for analyst’s ability and available resources (Analyst Experience, #Stocks Covered, 
#Analysts at Brokerage Firm, and Star Analyst), and for the firm’s information environment 
(Forecast Dispersion, Institutional Ownership, and #New Articles). We include fixed effects 
(FE) for month and for firm.15  Table 5, Panel B presents covered firms’ characteristics.  Other 
variables are in Tables 2 and 3. 
 Column (1) of Table 6 presents the regression results for BUYS.  The coefficient on (FOIA 
Analyst × Post) is significantly positive at the 0.05 level. Thus, after controlling for equity risk, 
analyst characteristics, and the firm’s information environment, we find evidence consistent with 
FDA records providing value-relevant information to FOIA requesting analysts. In economic 
terms, the 0.0169 coefficient is the extra monthly return a BUY portfolio earns after a FOIA 
analyst receives the requested FDA records.  This translates to a 20.3% annualized return. The 
magnitude of the return is consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) information search 
model, which suggests that an analyst would search for non-public information when the benefits 
of the search are economically significant. 
We find a significantly positive coefficient on PhD/MD, consistent with analysts with 
terminal science or medical degrees leveraging their specialized knowledge to better assess 
future stock values for healthcare companies. This finding is consistent with Bradley, Gokkaya, 
and Liu (2017), who find that analysts with prior work experience in their covered industries are 
better predictors of future earnings. In contrast, having an MBA degree provides no significant 
additional expertise, a finding somewhat consistent with De Franco and Zhou (2009), who find 
weak evidence that having a CFA improves analyst’s ability to forecast earnings. 
                                                        
15 Alternatively, we include a fixed effect for the analyst.  With this fixed effect, we cannot include time invariant 
analyst characteristics such as MBA or PhD/MD into the regression equation. The empirical results with this fixed 
effect are qualitatively the same as those without the analyst fixed effect.  Specifically, the coefficients on FOIA 
Analyst x Post are qualitatively the same and remain significant at the same levels. 
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The significantly positive coefficient on Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock supports the view 
that FOIA analysts interpret the requested FDA record(s) in similar ways.  The statistically 
negative coefficient on Prior 8K Filing is consistent with an 8-K filing muting an analyst’s 
advantage in using the information contained in the requested FOIA record. Frequent FOIA 
Requester has a significantly positive coefficient, consistent with the view that analysts who use 
FOIA requests more frequently are the ones who benefit most from these records. The 
coefficient on FOIA Industry Expertise, however, is insignificantly different from zero.  The 
other variables support those found in prior literature (Firm Size, B/M, Momentum, Analyst 
Experience, #Stocks Covered, Forecast Dispersion, Institutional Ownership, #News Article). 
Column (2) contains the regression results on stock returns on SELL portfolios. Stock 
returns are negatively related to the receipt of FDA records by requesting analysts, as seen by the 
significantly negative coefficient on (FOIA Analyst × Post), (p-value < 0.10).  In economic 
terms, FOIA analysts issuing sell recommendations after the receipt of a requested FDA record, 
on average, avoid a monthly loss of 1.38% when compared to analysts without these records. 
This translates to an annualized loss of 16.6%, which is consistent with Grossman and Stiglitz’s 
(1980) information search model.  
Similar to BUY portfolios, stock returns on SELL portfolios are significantly related to the 
risk factors Firm Size, B/M, and Momentum.  SELL portfolios earn more negative stock returns 
for analysts with science or medical knowledge (PhD/MD) or have an expertise with respect to 
the FOIA process (Frequent FOIA Requester).  We also find that returns on sell 
recommendations are associated with a better information environment in general (Forecast 
Dispersion, Institutional Ownership), with #News Articles, and with other analysts requesting the 
same FDA record (Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock). Similar to the results on BUY portfolios, 
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the filing of a Form 8-K prior to the receipt of the FDA record mutes the negative return on the 
SELL portfolios. The other independent variables are insignificantly different from zero. In 
summary, Table 6 presents evidence consistent with analysts finding FOIA requested FDA 
records to be informative in making their future stock recommendations. 
 
Information or Better Skill: Alternative Control Sample 
 An alternative explanation is that FOIA analysts are better stock pickers than non-FOIA 
analysts.  That is, even though we control for many analyst characteristics, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that omitted analyst characteristics might be driving our results.  For example, FOIA 
analysts may pay more attention to their covered stocks than non-FOIA analysts.  
To examine this alternative explanation, we gather all FOIA requests that were rejected by 
the FDA (see Table 3) and examine differences in subsequent stock returns between FOIA 
analysts receiving their requested FDA records (treatment group) and FOIA analysts not 
receiving their requested FDA records (new control group). Since the treatment and control 
samples encompass the same group of analysts, the primary difference between the two groups is 
the receipt/non-receipt of requested FDA record(s). We already found evidence (see Table 4, 
Panel B) that FOIA analysts are more likely to provide a new recommendation after they receive 
their requested records. 
 We create a new indicator variable, Receipt of FOIA Request, equal to one if the FOIA 
analyst received his/her requested record(s), and zero otherwise.  We interact this variable with 
Post, thus testing for differences in stock returns on BUY (SELL) portfolios before and after 
receipt of FDA records. The regressions control for equity risk, the overall information 
environment of the firm, the number of news stories, and the information environment 
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surrounding the FDA record itself.   Since our sample includes only those analysts making FOIA 
requests, we omit the analyst experience and ability variables in our regression specifications.16  
Table 7 contains the regression results. The empirical findings are consistent with the 
information hypothesis associated with the receipt of the FDA records.  Specifically, the 
coefficient on (Receipt of FOIA Request × Post) is significantly positive at the 0.05 level for the 
regressions on BUY portfolios and is significantly negative at the 0.10 level for the regressions 
on SELL portfolios.  In economic terms, FOIA analysts earn, on average, 2.32% higher monthly 
returns on their BUY portfolios and avoid 1.70% lower monthly returns on their SELL portfolios 
when in possession of the FDA records. The equity risk variables and some of the information 
environment variables remain significantly different from zero.   In sum, Table 7 provides 
evidence consistent with FDA records providing valuable information to requesting analysts. 
  
VI.  INSIDE THE FDA RECORDS 
Our large sample stock return results are consistent with FOIA records providing value-
relevant information to FOIA analysts.  However, they do not lend much insight into the type of 
information FOIA analysts use in revising their recommendations. In this section, we go inside a 
subset of FDA records and examine (1) the content of these records and (2) the types of 
information within these records most associated with analysts’ revised stock recommendations. 
To gain access to FDA records, we filed two separate FOIA requests to the FDA in July 
2017 asking for a subset of Form 483s and Warning Letters sent to our FOIA analysts. Form 
483s and most warning letters contain a list of factory violations only.  We select these two 
record-types because they are relatively easy (for us) to read and understand when compared to 
                                                        
16 We also estimate the DiD equation with analyst experience and ability variables. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 7.  
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EIRs or RECs, and the information contained in these records are similar across records allowing 
us to classify the information into various “buckets.”   
To keep our sample manageable, we randomly selected 46 of the 92 Forms 483 and all 16 
Warning Letters from our initial sample that resulted in a post-receipt recommendation by the 
FOIA analyst. The FDA sent us files on all our requests.  However, only 41 of the requested files 
contained all of the needed information for this analysis – a record of the analyst’s request letter, 
a record of the FDA’s reply to the analyst, and the FDA Form 483 or warning letter itself.  Two 
of the warning letters were not related to factory inspections, and therefore, were not used.  Most 
of the missing records are from requests by the analyst prior to 2011, leading us to infer that the 
FDA only sent us records from their computer bank.  Our final sample has 27 Form 483s and 12 
warning letters. 
We printed and manually read each of the 39 FDA records.  After a joint consultation, we 
classified the factory violations into four distinct types: product, manufacturing, testing, and 
documentation.  A product violation is a mention of a substandard drug or medical device.  A 
manufacturing violation refers to a defect in a factory’s manufacturing process.  A test violation 
is when the firm fails to establish a mandated test to monitor its processes or products, or 
receives a criticism as to how a test was conducted.  A documentation violation occurs when the 
firm fails to adequately document its procedures or test results.    
Appendix C contains snapshots from the records the FDA sent us. The blackened parts are 
redactions by the FDA.  We classify the excerpt from the Thoratec Corporation Warning Letter 
as a product violation because it refers to a medical device that “may have caused or contributed 
to a [patient’s] death.” The excerpt from the Hospira Form 483 is a manufacturing violation 
because it discusses how a factory “promotes the propagation of microbial contamination.” The 
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Alpharma Form 483 includes a “failure to perform the preparatory test for the validation of the 
membrane filtration method…” and, therefore, is classified as a testing violation. The Genzyme 
Form 483 disclosure is an example of a documentation violation in that it states that “activities 
performed during drug substance manufacture are not adequately documented.” 
Table 8, Panel A contains a numeration of our violation categories. On average, each record 
contains 9.82 violations, with a range of 1 to 25 violations [untabulated].  The two most 
prevalent violations relate to testing and documentation, with 82% and 74% of the records 
having at least one testing or documentation violation, respectively. Manufacturing (44%) and 
product (33%) violations also are commonly found.  We further note that 21% of the records use 
the existence of a current or previous complaint as an example of a product violation and 
therefore we include it as a separate category. 
Ex ante, we expect product, manufacturing, and complaints to be associated with more 
negative news, as these violations may be indicative of more severe and possibly more expensive 
problems within the firm. Conversely, we expect testing and documentation violations to be less 
costly to the firm, thus being indicative of less negative or problematic news.17   
 
Regression Results 
We regress two measures of FOIA analysts’ post-receipt stock recommendations on the 
number and type of each violation. NegConsensus is an indicator if the FOIA analyst’s first post-
receipt recommendation is more negative than the consensus recommendation on that date for all 
                                                        
17 Anecdotally, in 2014, an analyst at Leerink Partners wrote in a “research note” that she is not changing her 
“outperform” rating on HeartWare after the company released a statement announcing the receipt of a warning letter 
related to its Florida manufacturing facility (Seiffert 2014).  Notably, the warning letter found issues with the plant’s 
“procedures for validating device design, procedures for implementing corrective and preventive action, maintaining 
records related to investigations and validation of computer software.” (Seiffert 2014) We would classify these 
issues as testing and documentation violations. 
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non-FOIA analysts. Downgrade is an indicator if the FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt 
recommendation is a downgrade from his/her previous stock recommendation.  If our ex ante 
expectations are correct about the relative costs of correcting these violations, and if the analyst 
is using this information, we would expect to see positive associations between NegConsensus 
(Downgrade) and product, manufacturing, or complaint violations, and negative associations 
with testing or documentation violations.   
Table 9, Panel B contains the regression results on NegConsensus.  In column (1), we find 
no association between NegConsensus and the number of violations contained in the FDA 
record, suggesting the number of violations itself does not influence the FOIA analyst’s post-
receipt recommendation.  However, in column (2), we find evidence that the severity of the 
information contained in the FDA records is associated with the FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt 
recommendation, as evidenced by the significantly negative coefficient on Documentation and 
the significantly positive coefficient on Complaint.  Further, we note that the R-squared value for 
the regression in column (2) is 0.19, explaining about 19% of variation in NegConsensus.  In 
Panel C, we present the regression results on Downgrade. The results are consistent with FOIA 
analysts being less likely to downgrade stocks with Documentation violations, as evidenced by 
its significantly negative coefficient in column (2).18 Both panels support our expectations about 
associations between recommendation revisions and the severity of the listed violations. 
Finally, we discover that 7 of the 39 records resulted in subsequent class action lawsuits in 
which plaintiffs specifically accuse the firm of hiding adverse information from investors by not 
                                                        
18 We also regress individual one-year stock returns following the first post-receipt recommendation on the number 
of violations and the type of violations, respectively for each record.   Wong, Wong, and Zhang (2017) do a similar 
type of analysis for earnings forecast accuracy in China based on the content of home based/international based 
analyst reports. Our results are consistent with our analyst recommendation results in that we find significantly 
negative coefficients on ln(number of violations) and on Manufacturing, respectively.  That is, we find valuation 
effects associated with the severity of the violations stated in the Form 483/Warning Letter. 
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revealing the existence or contents of the Form 483 or warning letter. To see if FOIA analysts 
anticipate the ramifications surrounding this negative event, we create an indicator (Lawsuit) for 
these 7 firms.  As column (3) of Panels B and C show, FOIA analysts are more likely to have a 
negative post-receipt stock recommendation vis-à-vis the consensus recommendation (Panel B) 
and are more likely to downgrade the firm’s stock (Panel C) for firms that ultimately are sued for 
not disclosing the contents of these specific records.  In summary, this section presents evidence 
consistent with analysts differentiating among violation types when making their subsequent 
recommendations. 
 
 
VII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This study adds to the literature on sell-side analysts’ search for private information by 
examining a source of not readily accessible information – FOIA requested FDA records. We 
obtain our data through our own FOIA requests, asking the FDA to send us information on past 
FOIA requests as well as copies of some specific records sent to analysts. 
 Our findings are consistent with healthcare analysts using FOIA-requested FDA records to 
make more profitable stock recommendations. We also present evidence that these FOIA 
analysts revise their stock recommendations more frequently and sooner than healthcare analysts 
not receiving FDA records.  Further, a content analysis of specific FDA records on factory 
inspections provides evidence consistent with less serious violations (e.g., testing or 
documentation) being less aligned with downward recommendation revisions than more serious 
violations (e.g., product or manufacturing). 
 Our study is the first to do an extensive analysis into the process by which analysts gather 
qualitative, non-public information from a source outside of firm management.  As such, it 
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complements prior studies on analysts’ search for private information by providing a new peek 
into a different “black box” of inputs used by sell-side equity analysts when formulating their 
stock recommendations. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
 Definition 
Dependent Variables  
FOIA Requester Indicator equal to 1 for an analyst who filed FOIA requests to the FDA, and 0 
otherwise. 
Returns  Daily stock returns as reported by CRSP. 
NegConsensus Indicator equal to 1 if a FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt recommendation is more 
negative than the consensus recommendation on that date for all non-FOIA 
analysts. 
Downgrade  Indicator equal to 1 if an FOIA analyst’s first post-receipt recommendation is a 
downgrade. 
  
FOIA Variables  
FOIA Analyst  Indicator equal to 1 for an analyst who receives requested FOIA records, and 0 
otherwise. 
Post Indicator equal to 1 for periods after the FOIA receipt date, and 0 otherwise. 
Receipt of FOIA Request Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA sends the FOIA requested record to the requesting 
analyst; 0 if the analyst does not receive the requested record. 
Analyst Characteristics  
Analyst Experience Number of years the analyst has made recommendations from I/B/E/S. 
#Forecasts  Number of the analyst’s forecasts on the FOIA stock within one year before the 
FOIA request from I/B/E/S. 
#Stocks Covered Number of stocks covered by the analyst from I/B/E/S. 
Past Forecast Error The analyst’s last one-year earnings forecast error for the previous fiscal year 
from I/B/E/S. 
Past Recommendation The last stock recommendation prior to the FOIA analyst’s request. It is equal to 
1 for Strong Buy, 2 for Buy, 3 for Hold, 4 for Underperform, and 5 for Sell from 
I/B/E/S. 
PhD/MD (MBA) Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst has a PhD/MD (MBA) degree, and 0 otherwise 
from LinkedIn and other websites. 
Star Analyst Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst is voted an all-American star analyst in the 
October issue of The Institutional Investor magazine for the given year, and 0 
otherwise. 
#Analysts at Brokerage 
Firm  
Number of analysts at the analyst’s brokerage firm from I/B/E/S. 
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FOIA Characteristics 
FOIA Industry Expertise Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst filed at least one FOIA request on uncovered 
stocks in the same industry, and 0 otherwise. 
Frequent FOIA Requester Indicator equal to 1 if the analyst filed at least three FOIA requests to the FDA, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Multiple FOIA Requests 
on Stock 
Indicator equal to 1 if there were more than one FOIA request on the same stock 
within a month of each other, and 0 otherwise. 
Prior 8K Filing Indicator equal to 1 if the FOIA request is preceded by a Form 8-K filing with 
some information about the FDA record, and 0 otherwise. 
FDA Record Violations  
Number of Violations Number of violations identified in the FDA record. 
Product Indicator equal to 1 if a FDA record mentions a substandard drug or medical 
device. 
Manufacturing Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record refers to a defect in a factory’s 
manufacturing process. 
Testing Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record refers to the firm’s failure to establish a 
mandated test to monitor its processes or products, or receives a criticism as to 
how a test is conducted. 
Documentation Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record mentions a failure to adequately document 
its procedures or test results. 
Complaint Indicator equal to 1 if the FDA record refers to the existence of a current or 
previous consumer complaint as an example of a product violation. 
Lawsuit Indicator equal to 1 for a subsequent class action lawsuit in which the plaintiffs 
specifically accuse the firm of hiding adverse information from investors by not 
revealing the existence or contents of the Form 483 or warning letter. 
Other Independent Variables 
B/M Ratio of the book value of equity to the market value of equity from Compustat. 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of lagged market capitalization in millions of dollars from 
CRSP. 
Forecast Dispersion Standard deviation of the current two-year ahead EPS forecasts from I/B/E/S. 
Institutional Ownership Proportion of shares held by institutional investors as reported by the Thomson 
Reuters Ownership Database. 
Momentum Firm’s monthly-equivalent buy-and-hold return in the past 12 months as reported 
from CRSP. 
#News Articles Number of daily newspaper articles on a given firm by Dow Jones Newswires as 
reported by RavenPack. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FDA Record Types 
 
 
Factory Inspections  
Establishment 
Inspection Report 
(EIR)  
Upon completion of an inspection, an EIR is written which details 
inspection findings.  
Form 483 A Form 483 is issued to firm management at the conclusion of an 
inspection when an investigator has observed any conditions that may 
constitute violations of the Food Drug and Cosmetic (FD&C) Act and 
related Acts. 
Post-market Surveillance 
Databases 
 
FDA Adverse Event 
Reporting System 
(FAERS) 
FAERS is a database that contains information on adverse drug 
reactions (ADR) and medication error reports submitted to FDA. It 
supports the FDA’s post-market safety surveillance program for all 
approved drugs and therapeutic biologics. 
Medical Device 
Reporting (MDR) 
MDR is FDA’s post-market surveillance tool to monitor device 
performance, detect potential device-related safety issues, and 
contribute to benefit-risk assessments of these products. Both 
mandatory and voluntary reports are included. 
Center for Food Safety 
and Applied Nutrition 
(CFSAN) Adverse 
Event Reporting  
System (CAERS) 
CAERS are reports about adverse health events and product 
complaints related to CFSAN-regulated products, including 
conventional foods, dietary supplements and cosmetics. Reports are 
mandatory and voluntary for dietary supplements, and are voluntary 
for all other products. 
Vaccine Adverse Event 
Reporting System 
(VAERS) 
The purpose of VAERS is to detect possible signals of adverse events 
associated with vaccines.  Reports are voluntary only. 
Warning Letter (WL) When the FDA finds that a manufacturer has significantly violated 
FDA regulations, it notifies the manufacturer in the form of a warning 
letter. 
Approval 
Recommendation 
(REC) 
Approval recommendations (RECs) contain the FDA’s decisions on 
New Drug Application (NDA) and Biologic License Application 
(BLA). The NDA application is the vehicle through which drug 
sponsors formally propose to the FDA approval of the sale and 
marketing in the U.S of a new drug. BLA is a request for permission 
to introduce, or deliver for introduction, a biologic product into 
interstate commerce. 
Other Includes company responses to FDA reports, correspondence, meeting 
minutes, alert, safety review and Notices of Inspection (Form 482). 
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Appendix C 
Examples of Types of Disclosures in Warning Letters and Forms 483 (Factory Inspections) 
 
1.  Product Violation: Thoratec Corporation Warning Letter (January 3, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Manufacturing Violation: Hospira Form 483 (January 4, 2012) 
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3.  Testing Violation:  Form 483:  Alpharma Form 483 (September 27, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Documentation Violation:  Genzyme Form 483 (October 10, 2008) 
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Figure 1 
 
FDA Drug Approval Process and Post-Market Monitoring* 
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Phase I: small sample test for toxicity 
 
Phase II: medium sample test for viability 
 
Phase III: large sample randomized trial for effectiveness and safety 
 
 
 
 
 
      
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               Rejection              Phase IV                Approval 
 
                                                                              Approval 
 
 
Post-Market Monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The shaded rectangles contain all FDA records subject to FOIA requests [REC, FAERS, MDR, 
CAERS, VAERS].  Everything above REC is not subject to FOIA requests. See Appendix B for 
a description of the FOIA-eligible FDA records. 
FDA Approval 
Recommendation 
(REC) 
Investigational New Drug 
(IND) 
New Drug Application (NDA) or Biologic License 
Application (BLA) 
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Figure 2 
 
Factory Inspection Process* 
 
 
FDA Initiates Factory Inspection 
 
 
Inspection Complete 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The shaded rectangles contain all records subject to FOIA requests. See Appendix B for a 
description of the FOIA FDA records. 
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day t-2 +1 
 
Figure 3 
 
Time Frames for Accruing Raw Stock Returns 
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Table 1 
FOIA Requests to the FDA 
 
Panel A: FOIA Requests by Year 
Year 
 
 
 
Requests from 
Non-Analysts 
 
(1) 
Requests from 
Analysts 
 
(2) 
Requests from 
Analysts on I/B/E/S 
 
(3) 
Total Requests 
 
 
(4) 
1999 3,637 3 0 3,640 
2000 3,963 6 4 3,969 
2001 4,540 7 3 4,547 
2002 19,629 45 24 19,674 
2003 16,586 17 9 16,603 
2004 19,959 19 12 19,978 
2005 17,458 32 24 17,490 
2006 18,394 37 23 18,431 
2007 10,946 31 15 10,977 
2008 8,942 31 18 8,973 
2009 9,980 70 47 10,050 
2010 9,330 73 57 9,403 
2011 9,341 102 77 9,443 
2012 8,783 133 68 8,916 
2013 9,830 155 77 9,985 
2014 9,958 112 70 10,070 
Total 181,276 873 528 182,149 
 
Panel B: Most Frequent Analyst Requests (Over 20 Requests) 
Brokerage Firm No. of 
Requests 
Rank No. of Requests in 
Final Sample 
Favus Institutional Research 87 1 0 
RBC Capital Markets 61 2 54 
Jefferies & Co 57 3 45 
Wells Fargo Securities 57 3 49 
Merrill Lynch 34 5 32 
Leerink Swan & Co 32 6 21 
Cowen and Company 32 6 0 
Morgan Stanley 29 8 21 
Northcoast Research 29 8 19 
Robert W Baird & Co 28 10 18 
Collins Stewart LLC 25 11 0 
Sanford Bernstein & Co  23 12 17 
Citigroup 23 12 15 
Deutsche Bank 22 14 18 
JP Morgan 21 15 16 
UBS 20 16 11 
Stifel Nicolaus & Co 20 16 12 
Panel A presents the number of requests by year. Requests from Non-Analysts include public and private 
companies, hospitals, doctors, law firms, consulting firms and individuals. Requests from Analysts are requests 
from sell-side analysts identified in the FDA pdf file. Requests from Analysts on I/B/E/S are requests from sell-
side analysts in the FDA pdf file matched with the I/B/E/S database. Year is the year the request was made. 
Panel B ranks the brokerage or research firm by the number of FOIA requests. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2714551 
 42 
Table 2 
 
 Analysts’ Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Analysts’ Characteristics 
 FOIA Analysts Control Analysts Difference with 
Control Analysts 
 Average Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Average Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Diff. in 
Avg. 
t-stat. of 
Diff. 
Analyst Experience 5.798 4.055 245 7.580 4.492 7,008 -1.782*** -6.74 
#Stocks Covered 8.606 4.279 245 8.365 5.358 7,008 0.241 0.86 
Star Analyst 0.153 0.360 245 0.104 0.305 7,008 0.049** 2.10 
MBA 0.526 0.499 245 0.483 0.500 7,008 0.043 1.32 
PhD/MD 0.262 0.440 245 0.314 0.464 7,008 -0.052* -1.82 
#Forecasts  6.208 2.811 245 5.002 2.924 7,008 1.206*** 6.59 
Past Recommendation 2.437 1.037 245 2.216 0.937 7,008 0.221*** 3.29 
Past Forecast Error 0.006 0.017 245 0.004 0.012 7,008 0.002** 2.33 
#Analysts at Brokerage Firm 82.669 70.077 245 70.988 62.192 7,008 11.681** 2.57 
 
 
Panel B:  Probit Model for the Prediction of FOIA Requests 
Dependent Variable: FOIA Requester Coefficient t-statistic Marginal 
Probability 
Analyst Experience  -0.049*** -5.61 -0.3% 
Ln (#Stocks Covered) 0.021 0.52 0.1% 
Star Analyst 0.099 1.03 0.6% 
MBA 0.095 1.58 0.6% 
PhD/MD -0.111 -1.60 -0.7% 
Ln(# Forecasts) 0.343*** 6.03 2.0% 
Past Recommendation 0.099*** 3.25 0.6% 
Past Forecast Error 4.374** 2.35 25.5% 
Ln (#Analysts at Brokerage Firm) 0.082** 2.54 0.5% 
Observations  7,253   
Pseudo R-squared 0.06   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). Panel A presents characteristics of FOIA analysts and control analysts, respectively. Panel B presents a 
probit model for predicting FOIA requests. We require that each observation must have non-missing 
information for all covariates. We report coefficients, their heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics, and the 
marginal probability change induced by a one-unit change in the value of specific covariate from its sample 
average. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  
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Table 3 
 
FOIA Requests to FDA 
 
Panel A:  Types of FDA Records Requested by Analysts under the FOIA  
Year Establishment 
Inspection Report 
(EIR) 
Form 
483 
Post Market 
Surveillance 
Database 
Warning 
Letter 
(WL) 
Approval 
Recommendation 
(REC) 
Other Total 
Total 54 226 127 57 65 126 655 
 
 
Panel B: Outcomes of Requests by Analysts for Unique FDA Records 
 Sent Partial 
Sent 
Denial No 
Record 
Withdrawn Other 
Reason 
Pending Total 
Total 385 8 18 52 37 25 3 528 
 
 
Panel C: Percent of Unique Firms in the FOIA Analyst’s Portfolio with FOIA Requests 
Average 25 percentile Median  75 percentile Std. Dev. 
31.7% 9.1% 16.7% 41.7% 31.8% 
 
 
Panel D: Variations in FOIA Requests with Receipts 
 Number of 
Analysts 
Percent of all 
FOIA Analysts 
Number of 
Requests 
FOIA Requests on Multiple Stocks        
in at Least One Month 
65 32.7% 218 
Analyst’s Requests ≥ 3 63 31.7% 234 
Requests on Non-Covered Stocks 46 23.1% 66 
  Of Which Covered Later 17 8.5% 20 
This table presents descriptive data on the type of FDA records analysts request under the FOIA (Panel A) 
and the outcomes of these requests (Panel B). For Panel A, see Appendix B for a description of each FDA 
report type. Post Market Surveillance Database is a combination of FAERS, MDR, CAERS, and VAERS. In 
Panels B Sent is when the FDA grants FOIA information to the investment company requester, Partial Sent is 
when at least one, but not all, of the requested records is sent, Denial is when no record is sent, No Record is 
when the FDA’s response is that the requested record does not exist, Withdrawn involves cases in which the 
requester voluntarily withdraws its FOIA request, and Other Reason refers to cases when the request is closed 
due to other reasons and no information is released to the requester. A single FOIA request may cover 
multiple categories. Panel C reports the percent of unique firms in the FOIA analyst’s portfolio with FOIA 
requests.  Panel D reports variations in how FOIA analysts use FOIA to make their requests. 
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Table 4 
Analysts’ Stock Recommendations Following Receipt of FDA Records 
 
Panel A:  Number of New Recommendations After Receipt of FDA Records  
Direction of First New 
Recommendation 
EIR Form 
483 
Complaints WL Other REC Total 
Recommendations 
Percent of 
Receipts 
Upgrade 6 25 4 4 8 2 49 11.0% 
Downgrade 3 27 12 6 15 5 68 15.3% 
Affirmation 6 40 14 6 17 6 89 20.0% 
Total 15 92 30 16 40 13 206 46.3% 
         
Number of Receipts 27 190 61 32 96 39 445 100.0% 
 
Panel B:  Comparisons of Percent of New Recommendations by Whether FOIA Analysts Receive or 
Do Not Receive FOIA Requested Records 
 
Direction of First 
New 
Recommendation 
FOIA 
Request 
with 
Receipt 
FOIA 
Request 
without 
Receipt 
z-stat 
(1) – (2) 
Non-FOIA 
Requested 
Stock 
z-stat 
(1) – (4) 
FOIA 
Request 
with 
Receipt 
(Year -2) 
z-stat 
(1) – (6) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Upgrade 11.0% 6.3% 2.09** 10.4% 0.39 6.3% 2.51** 
Downgrade 15.3% 13.6% 0.58 8.8% 3.68*** 11.2% 1.78* 
Affirmation 20.0% 13.1% 2.28** 10.1% 5.05*** 14.4% 2.23** 
Total Percent 46.3% 33.0% 4.09*** 29.3% 6.85*** 31.9% 4.44*** 
Observations 445 206  3,414  445  
 
Panel C:  Comparisons of Percent of New Recommendations on Same Stocks between FOIA and 
Non-FOIA Requesting Analysts 
 
Direction of First New 
Recommendation 
FOIA Analyst 
with Receipt 
Non-FOIA 
Analyst 
z-stat 
(1) – (2) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Upgrade 11.0% 3.9% 4.76*** 
Downgrade 15.3% 4.7% 6.19*** 
Affirmation 20.0% 3.2% 8.82*** 
Total Percent 46.3% 11.8% 14.49*** 
Observations 445 13,182  
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). Panel A describes the direction of the first new stock recommendation by FOIA analysts after receiving 
FDA records.  See Appendix B for a description of the record types. Panels B and C present the percentages of 
new recommendations by FOIA analysts with FDA records and compare them to percentages of new 
recommendations by analysts without these records. Pending requests are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Monthly Stock Returns Before and After the Receipt Date 
 
 
Panel B:  Firm Characteristics 
 Average Median Std. Dev. No. of Firms 
Market Capitalization ($Billion) 23.76 6.43 44.43 130 
B/M 0.61 0.34 1.89 130 
Momentum (Buy, Past 12 Months) 28.99% 12.71% 64.73% 129 
Momentum (Sell, Past 12 Months) 16.35% 7.79% 50.50% 126 
Forecast Dispersion 0.29 0.17 0.34 130 
Institutional Ownership 68.45% 78.30% 29.20% 130 
# News Articles 0.67 0 1.38 130 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). Panel A shows the average calendar-time monthly returns of stocks based on buy or sell recommendations. 
BUY encompasses both buys and upgrades in columns (1) through (3); SELL has holds/sells and downgrades in 
columns (4) through (6). Panel B presents summary statistics for firm characteristics. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
  
 
BUY Portfolios 
 
SELL Portfolios 
  
Pre-Receipt 
Date 
Post-Receipt 
Date 
Difference 
Pre-Receipt 
Date 
Post-Receipt 
Date 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FOIA Analysts 
0.61% 
[1.10] 
2.71%*** 
[5.12] 
2.10%*** 
[2.73] 
1.14%** 
[2.13] 
1.86%*** 
[4.13] 
0.72% 
[1.03] 
Control Analysts 
1.04%*** 
[9.06] 
1.50%*** 
[11.41] 
0.46%*** 
[2.64] 
1.54%*** 
[11.87] 
2.31%*** 
[17.90] 
0.77%*** 
[4.21] 
Difference 
-0.43% 
[-0.76] 
1.21%** 
[2.22]  
-0.40% 
[-0.73] 
-0.45% 
[-0.96]  
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Table 6 
 
Regressions on BUY and SELL Portfolios 
Dependent Variable Returns on BUY Portfolios Returns on SELL Portfolios 
 (1) (2) 
FOIA Analyst -0.0026 -0.0077 
 [-0.33] [-1.10] 
Post 0.0099 0.0184* 
 [1.11] [1.95] 
FOIA Analyst  Post 0.0169** -0.0138* 
 [2.38] [-1.89] 
Firm Size -0.0085*** -0.0041*** 
 [-4.12] [-4.42] 
B/M 0.0053** 0.0151** 
 [2.05] [2.41] 
Momentum -0.0904*** -0.5827*** 
 [-3.11] [-6.35] 
Analyst Experience 0.0005 0.0005 
 [1.64] [1.02] 
Ln (# Stocks Covered) -0.0090** 0.0031 
 [-2.44] [1.21] 
Ln (#Analysts at Brokerage Firm) 0.0010 -0.0002 
 [0.57] [-0.15] 
PhD/MD 0.0101** -0.0189*** 
 [2.56] [-2.69] 
MBA -0.0009 -0.0012 
 [-0.35] [-0.36] 
Star Analyst -0.0015 -0.0089 
 [-0.31] [-0.60] 
Frequent FOIA Requester 0.0229** -0.0472*** 
 [2.10] [-2.70] 
FOIA Industry Expertise 0.0034 -0.0064 
 [0.26] [-0.22] 
Forecast Dispersion -0.0292*** 0.0548*** 
 [-3.16] [3.69] 
Institutional Ownership 0.0190** -0.0465*** 
 [2.48] [-3.00] 
Ln (1+# News Articles) 0.0145* -0.0577*** 
 [1.69] [-3.94] 
Previous 8K Filing -0.0104*** 0.0130* 
 [-3.55] [1.66] 
Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock 0.0117** -0.0078*** 
 [2.40] [-2.60] 
Constant 0.0556*** 0.0470 
 [6.63] [0.55] 
Month and Firm FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 363,234 352,931 
R-squared (%) 0.88 0.93 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). This table presents regression results on daily stock returns for BUY and SELL portfolios.  t-statistics 
are in parentheses. Returns are winsorized at 0.01%, and standard errors are clustered at the month level. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
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Table 7 
 
Regressions on Alternative Control Sample 
Dependent Variable Stock Returns on BUY 
Portfolios 
Stock Returns on SELL 
Portfolios 
 (1) (2) 
Receipt of FOIA Request -0.0040 -0.0032 
 [-0.38] [-0.33] 
Post 0.0131 0.0157** 
 [1.01] [2.34] 
Receipt of FOIA Request  Post 0.0232** -0.0170* 
 [2.12] [-1.71] 
Firm Size -0.0091*** -0.0164*** 
 [-2.71] [-4.19] 
B/M 0.0322*** 0.0072* 
 [3.96] [1.73] 
Momentum -0.1399*** -0.7285*** 
 [-3.29] [-8.46] 
Forecast Dispersion -0.0146 0.0550*** 
 [-1.38] [2.98] 
Institutional Ownership 0.0070 -0.0546*** 
 [0.50] [-3.69] 
Ln(1+# News Articles) 0.0528*** -0.0926*** 
 [3.51] [-4.46] 
Multiple FOIA Requests on Stock 0.0034 -0.0244** 
 [0.25] [-2.05] 
Constant 0.1675*** 0.2972*** 
 [4.11] [5.29] 
Month and Firm FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 24,987 33,497 
R-squared (%) 0.58 0.84 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). This table presents regression analyses of daily stock returns on BUY and SELL portfolios.  The 
control sample consists of FOIA analysts who did not receive a requested FDA record. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Stock returns are winsorized at 0.01%, and standard errors are clustered at the month level. See 
Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2714551 
 48 
 
Table 8 
 
Information Contained in Warning Letters and Form 483s  
 
Panel A: Types of Violations  
 Mean 
Total 
Violations 
Product 
Violation 
Manufacturing 
Violation 
Testing 
Violation 
Documentation 
Violation 
Complaint 
Full Sample       
Number 9.82 13 17 32 29 8 
 %  33% 44% 82% 74% 21% 
       
Warning Letters  7 5 12 6 5 
Form 483s  6 12 20 23 3 
 
 
Panel B: FOIA Analyst First Post-Receipt Recommendation is More Negative  
                than Consensus Recommendation 
Dependent Variable NegConsensus 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (Number of Violations) 0.0376   
 [0.46]   
Product  0.0588  
  [0.29]  
Manufacturing   0.0310  
  [0.12]  
Testing  0.0234  
  [0.07]  
Documentation  -0.4754**  
  [-2.45]  
Complaint   0.3133*  
  [1.66]  
Lawsuit   0.6240** 
   [2.09] 
Constant 0.5678*** 0.9530*** 0.3610*** 
 [2.82] [2.87] [3.68] 
Observations 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.01 0.19 0.05 
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Panel C: FOIA Analyst’s First Post-Receipt Recommendation is a Downgrade  
Dependent Variable: Downgrade 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (Number of Violations) 0.0872   
 [0.90]   
Product  -0.3187  
  [-1.60]  
Manufacturing   -0.0060  
  [-0.02]  
Testing  0.1129  
  [0.34]  
Documentation  -0.5730***  
  [-2.69]  
Complaint   0.1109  
  [0.33]  
Lawsuit   0.4583*** 
   [3.32] 
Constant 0.5422** 1.0146*** 0.5417*** 
 [2.39] [2.73] [5.11] 
Observations 39 39 39 
R-squared 0.01 0.29 0.04 
 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively (two 
tailed). t-statistics are in parentheses. Panel A has a numeration of the types of violations (See Appendix A for 
definitions). Panel B presents summary statistics for regressions on whether the FOIA analyst’s post-receipt 
first stock recommendation is more negative than the consensus stock recommendation. Panel C presents 
summary statistics for regressions on whether the FOIA analyst downgraded the stock recommendation after 
receipt of FOIA-requested FDA records. 
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